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In textbooks one often finds a distinction between three kinds of knowledge: knowing-that, 
knowing-how, and acquaintance knowledge. However, while these three forms of knowledge 
are well-known, epistemologists have traditionally focused almost exclusively on questions to 
do with knowing-that. Indeed, in the textbooks, the usual rationale given for mentioning the 
distinction at all is just to ensure that knowing-that is not confused with these other things one 
might call ‘knowledge’, and then the rest of the book proceeds to merrily devote itself solely 
to questions concerning knowing-that.1 And, not surprisingly, similar tendencies can be found 
in social epistemology.  
In recent years, however, these tendencies have begun to weaken somewhat. In particular, there 
has been a lot of new work on knowing-how, stimulated by Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) 
arguments for the intellectualist view that knowing-how is a species of knowing-that. The 
primary focus of this work has been on debates about the nature of knowing-how and debates 
between intellectualists and their anti-intellectualist opponents. But the literature on these 
issues has also started to include work dealing explicitly with the social dimensions of 
knowing-how. This chapter reviews some of the key developments in this area, focusing on 
discussions of the social function of the concept of knowing-how, testimony, demonstrating 
one’s knowledge to other people, and epistemic injustice.2 I will also try to identify some ideas 
 
1 As well as knowing-how ascriptions, there are also many other knowledge ascriptions where the complement of 
‘knows’ is an embedded question, for example, one can know when, where, what, and why. But with respect to 
these other forms of knowledge, and in contrast to knowing-how, it is more widely accepted that they can be 
analysed in terms of knowing-that (specifically, knowing some proposition that answers the embedded question). 
See fn.7 and section §4 below for related discussion. 
 
2 One notable issue I will not cover (for reasons of thematic unity and space) is recent discussions of group know-
how. The main focus in these works is on various issues concerning the relationships between group know-how 
and the cognitive states and abilities of the members of that group. Bird (2010), for example, argues that a group 
can know how to Φ without any of its members knowing how to Φ, as they each only know how to perform 
different parts of that total action of Φ-ing (see also Dragos 2019 for further discussion of this point). Palermos 
and Tollefsen (2018) and Birch (2019) provide arguments against different ways of trying to analyse group or 
joint know-how in terms of the propositional knowledge (or other propositional attitudes) of the members of the 
group, as well as their own positive analyses of group know-how. Habgood-Coote (2019b) provides an account 
of group knowledge on which a collective can know the answer to a question in virtue of its members knowing 
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that can help to unify various phenomena discussed within this literature, and I will discuss 
how these ideas might connect with debates concerning moral knowledge and testimony. 
1. The Social Role of KNOWS-HOW 
Craig (1990) famously advocates for a shift in how we approach epistemological inquiry. Craig 
thinks that such theorizing normally proceeds by collecting intuitions about the intension and 
extension of the concept of knowledge (or ‘KNOWS’)3 and then trying to provide analyses of 
the concept that fit those intuitions. In contrast, his suggestion is that we, first, identify plausible 
hypotheses about the basic human needs served by KNOWS (or that an ancestor of this concept 
would serve in an imagined ‘state of nature’), and then attempt to develop analyses of the 
concept that fit with those hypotheses, as well as our intuitions about the intension and 
extension of KNOWS.   
Craig’s famous hypothesis about the function of KNOWS is that it serves our basic human need, 
as inquirers, “to flag approved sources of information” (1990, 11). If I want to know whether 
p is true it makes sense for me not only to rely on my own ‘on board’ sources for generating 
true beliefs (faculties of perception and reason), but also to seek access to the beliefs of other 
people formed via their ‘on board’ sources. If p is the proposition that there is a wolf north of 
the village, and I have not ventured that way myself for some time, then it may be in my interest 
to seek information about whether p is true from others who have been in that area recently. 
But given that I am not in a position to directly assess whether p is true myself, and given that 
people can lie and mislead, I have an interest in identifying people who are reliable informants 
about such matters. And Craig claims that it this core human interest that our concept of 
knowledge serves.4  
Craig’s hypothesis has struck many philosophers as being very promising, at least when applied 
to knowledge-that (the knowledge one has when one knows that something is the case). But 
can it be extended to knowledge-how (the knowledge one has when one knows how to perform 
an action)? Craig tries to accommodate the concept of knowing-how (or ‘KNOWS-HOW’) within 
his framework by (i) suggesting that the concept serves our need as apprentices (i.e., a person 
 
different parts of that full answer, a view which is much more friendly to an intellectualist view of group know-
how. Dragos (2019) defends the idea that groups can possess know-how from an objection which appeals to the 
notion of epistemic extension. Dragos argues in reply that, unlike knowing-that, knowing-how cannot be 
epistemically extended. 
 
3 I will use small caps like this when referring to concepts.  
 
4 See Chapter [] in this volume for related discussion. 
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who wants to learn how to perform some action Φ) to seek out teachers who can either tell us 
or show us how to perform some action, and (ii) noting various connections between reliable 
teachers and reliable informants, and between possessing information and possessing abilities. 
This allows Craig to see the roles of the inquirer and the apprentice as being closely related. 
Habgood-Coote (2019a: 6-7) usefully suggests that we see this connection in terms of our 
social needs to pool resources that can serve as preconditions for action, with the inquirer’s 
perspective related to our need to acquire information from other people, and the apprentice’s 
perspective being tied to our need to pool capacities/abilities from other people. 
But, as Hawley (2011) pointed out in an influential discussion, there seems to be another 
important—and, arguably, more central—role played by KNOWS-HOW related to the 
perspective of what she calls the client. The client does not seek knowledge-how for themselves 
but only seeks someone who can reliably perform the relevant action for them: 
When I seek a plumber, hairdresser, or architect, usually this is because I need the drains fixed, 
my hair cut, or a building designed. I need have no interest in learning how to do these things 
myself, nor in finding someone who can either teach or assess others. Perhaps I know how to 
do such things already but am too busy or too lazy to get them done myself (and I can’t reach 
to cut my own hair). I call this ‘the client’s situation,’ in contrast with the inquirer’s and the 
apprentice’s situations. (Hawley 2011: 287) 
Similarly, Moore (1997: 173-174) in an earlier discussion (pre-dating the post Stanley and 
Williamson literature on know-how) writes: 
On [Craig’s] conception there is something basic about situations in which one wants to 
acquire some information, or a skill, and one is looking for reliable instruction. I wonder. Is 
there not something yet more basic about situations in which one is looking, not for someone 
who is a reliable instructor, but just for someone who is reliable? Suppose I need someone 
who knows how to fix the plumbing. I am probably not the least bit interested in acquiring the 
skill myself. 
Hawley and Moore focus on situations where someone wants to find someone else to perform 
all of an action for them but, as Habgood-Coote (2019a: 8) notes, the client may also be seeking 
someone else to help perform an action with them together. For this reason, Habgood-Coote 
characterises the idea here as the claim that the function of KNOWS-HOW is to serve our interests 
in identifying reliable collaborators.  
The suggestion then is that a key function of KNOWS-HOW is to serve our interests in identifying 
people who can reliably perform actions for or with us. This idea can, arguably, shed light on 
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many interesting features of knowing-how, including helping us to understand the source of 
notable objections to intellectualism based on the idea that knowing-how does not share one or 
more of the epistemic properties of knowing-that (e.g., Carter and Pritchard 2015, Cath 2011, 
Poston 2009, Setiya 2008).  
So, for example, Cath (2011) presents three supposed counterexamples, each of which relies 
on a case where, intuitively, knowing-how is present despite one of three standard conditions 
for the presence of knowing-that being absent—the anti-luck, justified belief, and belief 
conditions, respectively. The common thread in these examples is that each subject is still in a 
state that would reliably guide them in successful performances of the relevant action. And, as 
Levy (2014) discusses, Hawley’s concept of the client might help to explain why such a subject 
would still possess knowledge-how: 
In developing this theme, [Hawley] illuminates the feature of knowledge how to which Cath 
had pointed: its seeming resistance to being undermined by the kinds of factors that undermine 
knowledge that. Hawley calls these kinds of factors, on which both mainstream 
epistemologists and those concerned with testimonial reliability (like Fricker) have focused, 
upstream indicators of reliability. These indicators are available only to third persons who 
occupy a privileged position with regard to the agent and to those who assess her testimony: 
was she lucky in acquiring it? Is she justified in believing it? By contrast downstream 
indicators of reliability are the kinds most relevant to knowledge how, and are often accessible 
to agents who seek to learn from or to take advantage of the expertise of those who putatively 
possess knowledge how. These indicators show up in performance guided by knowledge how, 
which even novices are often able to distinguish from action that is not so guided. 
The idea from Hawley that Levy is discussing here is that when we ascribe knowledge-how we 
often do so on the basis of ‘downstream’ indicators, that is, indicators that the subject is in a 
state that would reliably guide in them in possible future actions of Φ-ing—where the relevant 
indicators of that would be successful performances of Φ-ing. This contrasts with ascriptions 
of knowledge-that where typically ‘upstream’ indicators are much more important, that is, 
indicators that the subject is in a true belief state, where these indicators might include things 
like “being in the right place to see what was going on or, more generally, having a reliable 
method for acquiring beliefs in that sort of area” (Hawley 2011: 292). 
In the case of knowing-that, it is standard to go a step further, of course, and try to define the 
nature of knowledge-that itself in terms of related upstream conditions that a true belief has to 
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meet for it to constitute a genuine state of knowledge.5 Hawley and Levy, following Craig, 
focus on the upstream conditions found in reliablist and virtue accounts of knowledge, like 
whether one’s true belief was the product of a reliable belief forming faculty or ability. But the 
point applies much more widely,6 for internalist analyses also appeal to upstream conditions 
about how one’s true belief was formed, e.g., whether the belief forming process was suitably 
related to (internally accessible) evidence or reasons.  
On the other hand, given the importance of downstream indicators for ascribing knowing-how 
we might speculate that downstream/forward-looking conditions should also feature in an 
analysis of knowing-how. And, if this is the case, then, in line with Levy’s remarks, we might 
be able to shed some light on why subjects possess knowledge-how in the kinds of cases 
provided by Cath (2011) and other related arguments. For in each of these cases the subject is 
still in a state that would reliably guide them in intentional actions of Φ-ing if they were to try 
to Φ. In which case, if being in a state which has these downstream action-guiding properties 
is sufficient for knowing how to Φ then we have an explanation of why knowing-how is present 
in these kinds of cases.  
If we assume that this distinction—between the upstream conditions required to possess 
knowing-that versus the downstream conditions required to possess knowing-how—does hold 
then that assumption might be used in an argument for a Rylean view of knowing-how, 
according to which knowing how to Φ is a kind of ability or disposition to Φ, as opposed to 
any kind of knowledge-that. For one can certainly possess the ability to Φ even if the upstream 
story of how one acquired one’s relevant beliefs about how to Φ includes the fact that they 
 
5 A knowledge-first epistemologist will deny that knowledge can be analysed as a special kind of true belief that 
meets such upstream conditions. But, nonetheless, knowledge-first epistemologists still agree that knowledge is 
subject to many of the same kinds of upstream conditions that other epistemologists endorse, they just deny that 
these conditions can be properly explicated without making reference again to knowledge at some point. That 
said, as one of the editors for this volume reminded me, it is also true that knowledge-first epistemologists often 
claim that knowledge is subject to various conditions that look to be downstream conditions, e.g., that one knows 
that p only if one is warranted in asserting p or relying upon the truth of p in one’s practical reasoning. This is an 
interesting complication for the distinctions I will draw in this section between upstream versus downstream 
knowledge, but one that I cannot explore on this occasion.  My inclination is to suggest that some downstream 
conditions on knowledge (e.g., being a state that can guide actions of making warranted assertions) may have the 
interesting feature that one cannot satisfy these downstream conditions without also satisfying certain upstream 
conditions (of the kind found in familiar analyses of knowledge-that) whilst still maintaining that many of the 
wider set of downstream conditions we are interested in when we ascribe knowledge (being a state that can guide 
all kinds of other actions) do not have this feature. On this approach upstream/theoretical knowledge would be 
viewed as a special case of the more general category of downstream/practical knowledge. 
6 As Hookway (2006: 105) says the ‘‘features that have been taken to be characteristic of knowledge have been 
backward-looking: they have concerned the history of the candidate belief or the kind of justification that the 




were obtained in a Gettier-style scenario, or that one ignored undefeated defeaters for that 
belief, etc. 
However, one can also acknowledge this distinction within a broadly intellectualist framework 
according to which knowing-how is some kind of propositional attitude state. Cath (2015), for 
example, offers a view on which there are two different kinds of knowledge-that “practical” 
and “theoretical”. Both kinds of knowledge require true belief but the further conditions that 
upgrade a state of true belief into genuine knowledge differ, with theoretical knowledge 
requiring the kinds of upstream conditions found in standard analyses of knowledge, and 
practical knowledge-that requiring downstream conditions connected to success in action, and 
possessing certain action-guiding dispositions when one acts. So, focusing on the kind of 
propositional knowledge that features in intellectualist analyses of know-how, possessing 
practical knowledge that w is a way for oneself to Φ, is a matter of having a true belief of the 
right form that can guide one in actions of intentionally Φ-ing. And, on the other hand, 
possessing theoretical knowledge that w is a way for oneself to Φ, is a matter of having a true 
belief with that content which meets one’s favoured set of upstream conditions.  
The general moral here is that both anti-intellectualists and (certain kinds of) intellectualists 
can accept the idea that knowing how to Φ is practical knowledge in the sense that it can be 
defined in terms of downstream conditions concerned with successful and guided performances 
of Φ-ing rather than the familiar upstream conditions on knowing-that; and this is an idea that 
accords well with Hawley’s insight that the function of KNOWS-HOW is tied to the client’s need 
to identify reliable performers. In the following two sections, we will see how the 
downstream/upstream distinction can also help us to understand apparent disanalogies between 
knowing-how and knowing-that with respect to acquiring knowledge from other people 
through testimony (§2), and demonstrating one’s knowledge to other people (§3).  
2. Testimony and Know-How 
With respect to testimony some authors have claimed (Carter and Pritchard 2015, Poston 2016, 
Poston and Carter 2018) that there is something like the following important difference 
between knowing-how and knowing-that: 
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The Difficulty of Transmission thesis (DT) It is more difficult to transmit (practical) 
knowing-how via testimony than is the case for knowing-that and other forms of 
knowing-wh.7 
The insertion of ‘practical’ in (DT) is to indicate that we are restricting our attention only to 
the form of knowledge attributed by the relevant interpretation of ‘S knows how to Φ’ 
ascriptions. Stanley and Williamson (2001) distinguished four different interpretations of such 
ascriptions, generated by the two different respective readings available for the convert 
pronoun (as a generic ‘one’ or as anaphoric on the main subject ‘S’), and the infinitival (as a 
deontic ‘ought’ or a dispositional/ability ‘can’), in the embedded ‘how to’ question. If we take 
the ascription (1) ‘Stephanie knows how to juggle’, for example, we get the following readings 
(with underlining and italics used to emphasise the different readings): 
(1a) For some way w, Stephanie knows that w is a way Stephanie can juggle.  
(1b) For some way w, Stephanie knows that w is a way one can juggle.  
(1c) For some way w, Stephanie knows that w is a way Stephanie ought to juggle.  
(1d) For some way w, Stephanie knows that w is a way one ought to juggle. 
The kind of practical knowledge at stake in the knowing-how debates is widely acknowledged 
to only be that knowledge ascribed by interpretation (1a), and the claim made by (DT) is only 
meant to apply to that form of ‘knowing-how’ (likewise for when I use the term ‘knowing-
how’ without qualification). 
With that clarification in place, some common ideas that might be appealed to in support of 
(DT) include the idea that knowing-how requires experience and training in a way that 
knowing-that does not, and that typically when we possess knowing-that we can share this 
knowledge with other people but the same does not seem to be true of knowing-how. As 
Hawley (2010: 397) wrote in the first extended discussion of testimony and knowing-how: 
 
7 The term ‘knowing-wh’ can cause confusion. Following Parent (2014), Stanley (2011), and others, I use the term 
in such a way that it includes knowing-how, as Parent (2014: 81) says ‘Knowing-wh includes knowing who, 
knowing what, knowing which, knowing where, knowing why, and knowing how (or “whow” if you’re a 
stickler)’. More precisely, I use ‘knowing-wh’ as a term for the forms of knowledge attributed by any knowledge 
ascription where the complement of ‘knows’ is an embedded question, and this is why I say ‘other forms of 
knowing-wh’ above as it is relatively uncontroversial that ‘S knows how to Φ’ ascriptions have this structure. On 
this usage of ‘knowing-wh’ then the debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists can be seen as a debate 
about whether all forms of knowing-wh can be analysed in terms of knowing-that, or whether there is at least one 
exception. Alternatively, ‘knowing-wh’ is sometimes used as a term for the forms of knowledge denoted by all 
‘knows’ plus embedded question constructions except for knowing-how ascriptions (e.g., Poston 2016 seems to 
use the term in this way). I think the inclusive use of ‘knowing-wh’ is more helpful, but nothing of substance 
hinges on these terminological decisions. 
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“Practical knowledge can’t always be obtained from books or lectures, since it often requires 
hands-on experience, whilst those who know how can’t always teach, and sometimes those 
who can’t do something can nevertheless teach others how to do it.” 
Another way to motivate (DT) is to consider the contrast between specific cases where practical 
knowing-how seems difficult to transmit through testimony with cases where knowing-that 
seems to be easily transmitted. Carter and Pritchard (2015) give a case where Roger tells David 
how to play a special guitar riff, and David thereby comes to know that that way is a way to 
play the riff, but he doesn’t yet know how to play the riff because he hasn’t practised the 
complex finger movements involved in it. Similarly, Poston (2016) relies on the contrast 
between pairs of inferences like this: 
Bad 
(1) Stephanie knows how to juggle.  
(2) Stephanie tells Hannah how to juggle. 
So, (3) Hannah knows how to juggle. 
Good 
(4) Stephanie knows how Ardern will govern.  
(5) Stephanie tells Hannah how Ardern will govern.  
So, (6) Hannah knows how Ardern will govern 
Bad is naturally interpreted as concerning ‘knowing-how’ in the sense that is at issue in the 
knowing-how debates identified earlier (i.e., the knowledge ascribed by an ‘S knows how to 
Φ’ ascription when the infinitival is interpreted as an ability modal and the covert pronoun is 
interpreted as anaphoric on the main subject). Good, however, concerns a form of ‘knowing 
how’ which even anti-intellectualists are usually happy to grant can be analysed as a kind of 
knowing-that in the standard way, that is, in terms of knowing some proposition that is a true 
answer to the embedded question.    
As the labels indicate, Poston takes it to be a datum that inferences like Good are good 
inferences and that inferences like Bad are not, and indeed, it does seem as if the first inference 
would be perfectly acceptable in most circumstances and that the latter would be problematic 
in most circumstances. And, importantly, it seems as if Bad would be bad even if we imagine 
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that the standard conditions conducive to the transmission of knowledge through testimony are 
all in place. 
For Poston this asymmetry points to the fact that (DT) is true which, in turn, he takes to support 
the conclusion that intellectualism is false. However, there are a number of ideas that an 
intellectualist might appeal to in resisting Poston’s disanalogy argument. To begin with, as 
Cath (2017) and Peet (2019) point out there are other cases where it seems that knowing-how 
is easily transmitted. Peet (2019: 895-96), for example, gives the following case: 
Sally, a tourist, arrives in a new city, and wants to visit the house of her favourite composer: Wolfgang 
von Wagner. Sally doesn’t know how to find the house. Luckily for her it is a popular tourist destination, 
and most locals know where it is located. She asks Mark, a passer-by, for directions. Mark knows where 
the house is located and sincerely tells her ‘‘It is the red house on Bond Street’’. Sally understands and 
accepts Mark’s testimony. 
In this scenario if we imagine that Sally knows how to get to Bond Street then it seems clear 
that she would come to know how to find the house of her favourite composer on the basis of 
accepting Mark’s testimony. And Peet goes on to defend the further claims that (i) the 
knowledge-how Sally would thereby gain would be knowledge-how in the sense at issue in the 
knowing-how debates, and (ii) that this new knowledge would be genuinely testimonial 
knowledge.  
Poston is aware of such cases and tries to handle them by analysing them in a way that is 
consistent with his assumption that (DT) is true. Poston (2016: 870) considers the following 
case of his own where it might seem that knowing-how is transmitted: 
John is an expert fisherman and, among other things, he knows how to tie many different knots. There is 
a specific knot he has heard about—the Bimini Twist—and he wants to learn how to tie this knot. He 
asks Sam and Sam tells him how to tie the Bimini Twist. It is plausible that John acquires some new 
practical knowledge from Sam’s testimony. John comes to know for the first time how to tie a Bimini 
Twist.  
Poston claims that the only knowledge transferred in such examples is deontic knowing-how-
to, that is, the kind of knowledge (1) ascribed to Stephanie when we interpreted it as (1c) or 
(1d). So, according to Poston, John only comes to know, from Sam’s testimony, that the 
relevant way w is a way that one ought to tie a Bimini Twist. But then given “his general knot 
tying practical knowledge John can successfully implement his new propositional knowledge 
of how one ought to tie the Bimini Twist” (Poston 2016: 870). So, Poston’s thinks that all that 
John gains from Sam’s testimony is deontic knowing-how-to, but he can then acquire practical 
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knowledge of how to tie the Bimini twist by drawing on his new deontic knowledge-how, and 
his existing practical knowledge-how with respect to tying knots in general.  
Peet presents a number of arguments against Poston’s diagnosis of this knot case, including an 
appeal to a variant case where the hearer does not already have any general knot-tying 
knowing-how but still comes to know how to tie another (simpler) kind of knot via a speaker 
telling them how to tie it. However, even if knowing-how can sometimes be transmitted easily 
the significance of that point is unclear. For, as Poston notes (2016: 870), (DT) is consistent 
with there being some cases where practical knowing-how is easily transferred via testimony, 
as long as it is still more generally true that knowing-how is difficult to transmit.8  
So, ideally, in responding to arguments like Poston’s, an intellectualist will not merely be able 
to point to cases where knowing-how is easily transmitted. Instead, they will also be able to 
provide a response to the cases used to motivate (DT) by either: (i) granting that these are cases 
where it is difficult to transmit knowing-how but then showing us how one can accommodate 
these cases, and the truth of (DT), within an intellectualist framework; or (ii) contesting the 
assumption that these are cases where it is difficult to transmit knowing-how, thereby 
undermining the argument for (DT).  
In developing the first kind of reply intellectualist can appeal to the fact that their analyses 
often stipulate that knowing-how is not merely a matter of knowing a proposition that answers 
the embedded ‘how to Φ’ question, but also meeting some further condition stating that one 
has to possess that knowledge in some distinctively practical way. The hope then will be that 
this further condition can illuminate why knowing-how does not easily transmit via testimony. 
Poston considers an intellectualist reply like this which appeals to Stanley and Williamson’s 
(2001) well-known view that knowing how is not merely a matter of knowing the right kind of 
proposition, but also knowing that proposition under a practical mode of presentation (PMP).9  
The explanation then of why (DT) is true will be that, while S can come to know a proposition 
of the form ‘w is a way for S to Φ’ via testimony alone, S cannot come to entertain w under a 
practical mode of presentation via testimony alone. As Hawley (2010: 400) notes, an 
 
8 Of course, a parallel point here cuts against Poston’s position, that is, one also can’t conclusively establish (DT) 
by merely pointing to some cases where it appears that knowing-how does not transmit easily. 
 
9 This notion is introduced by Stanley and Williamson (2001) in response to the simple insufficiency objections 
to intellectualism that, for example, I can know that that way is a way to ride a bicycle (pointing to someone riding 
a bike in a normal way) without myself knowing how to ride a bicycle. See Stanley (2011) and Pavese (2015, 




intellectualist who endorses this PMP view can grant that a textbook might enable us to know, 
of some way w, that w is a way for me to swim whilst also maintaining that reading the textbook 
“does not enable me to entertain this proposition under a practical mode of presentation; for 
that, I need to practise”. 
A worry with this specific version of response (i) is that the intellectualist’s notion of a PMP 
has been subjected to a great deal of criticism (see e.g., Glick 2015; Mosdell 2019), and Poston 
himself offers a number of criticisms of PMPs in defence of his testimony-based objection to 
intellectualism. It is important then that the intellectualists can defend themselves against 
testimony-based objections without appealing to PMPs at all. For example, the intellectualist 
could appeal to other intellectualist analyses—involving ‘further conditions’ other than a PMP 
condition—in the hope of finding another intellectualist-friendly account of (DT).10 Or, 
alternatively, they could give a response of kind (ii) outlined above by contesting the 
interpretation of the standard cases used to motivate (DT).  
Cath (2017) gives a version of this second kind of response by appealing to work by Stanley 
(2011)11 on how to interpret the modality of the infinitive in the relevant interpretation of 
‘Stephanie knows how to juggle’ that we identified earlier. Previously we represented that 
interpretation like so: 
(1a) For some way w, Stephanie knows that w is a way Stephanie can juggle.  
However, as Stanley discusses the ability modal in an embedded ‘how to’ question is better 
interpreted not using a bare ‘can’ ascription but something like a ‘can in normal circumstances’ 
ascription. That is, the better interpretation of the anaphoric and non-deontic reading of (1) is: 
(1a*) For some way w, Stephanie knows that w is a way Stephanie can juggle in her 
normal physical state. 
Suppose now Hannah does not already know how to juggle because she has never practised. 
Stephanie telling her how to juggle will clearly not result then in Hannah’s coming to know 
how to juggle. But the fact that Hannah has not acquired this knowledge-how from Stephanie’s 
testimony does not show that knowledge-how cannot be transmitted via testimony. For the 
proposition that Hannah would have to know in order for her to know how to juggle (in the 
 
10 See Waights Hickman (2019) and Cath (2020) for different suggestions of how knowing-how could be a 
matter of knowing a proposition in a distinctively practical way without any appeal to PMPs. 
 




relevant practical sense) is not the same proposition that Stephanie knows when she knows 
how to juggle. This can be seen by comparing (1a*) above with the corresponding 
interpretation of (11) ‘Hannah knows how to juggle’: 
(11a*) For some way w, Hannah knows that w is a way that Hannah can juggle in her 
normal physical state. 
Given that Hannah has never practised juggling, the proposition that she would need to know 
to make (11a*) true is a false proposition, for the standard way of juggling w is not a way that 
Hannah can juggle in her normal physical state because she has not developed the required 
physical dispositions, which can only be acquired through practice. In which case, as 
knowledge is factive, it is not a proposition that Stephanie can know to be true and so this is 
not a case where Stephanie possesses, but cannot transmit to Hannah, the practical knowledge 
that Hannah would need to possess for her to know how to juggle.  
Stepping back from the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist debates we can note how the fact that 
knowing-how can be at least difficult to acquire from testimony can be broadly explained by 
the ideas discussed in §1. For if knowing-how is a downstream-facing state (the possession of 
which entails the ability to intentionally Φ in normal circumstances), then it is no surprise that 
it can sometimes be difficult to acquire from testimony, given the fact that abilities are often 
difficult to acquire from mere testimony. Words can easily provide us with information, but 
not abilities or skills.12 
Intellectualists and anti-intellectualists can agree on these points and then add further details to 
this initial explanation reflecting their different accounts of knowing-how. So, an intellectualist 
might appeal to practical modes of presentation to explain why (DT) is true. Or, alternatively, 
they might appeal to the idea that when knowing how to Φ is a matter of knowing a proposition 
about your own abilities to explain why knowing-how is difficult to acquire (but not necessarily 
difficult to transmit) via testimony. And, on the other hand, a Rylean might appeal to the idea 
 
12 This is not to deny that verbal instructions about how to Φ can play an important role in someone coming to 
acquire a new ability to Φ or skill at Φ-ing. The point is just that merely grasping such instructions is usually not 
sufficient for gaining a new ability or skill, as one will also have to practise trying to follow those instructions, 
and learn from one’s mistakes and successes, etc. See Small (2014) for discussion of the transmission of skills 
that focuses on the idea of guided practice, which he takes to be a joint activity involving both the learner and the 
teacher. See also Habgood (2018) for an interesting critical discussion of various norms one could put forward 
claiming that it is permissible to show or demonstrate someone how to Φ only if one knows how to Φ oneself. On 
the basis of this discussion Habgood concludes that we shouldn’t think of skill learning as involving the 
transmission of skill from teacher to learner, and he also thinks that the failure of such norms puts pressure on 




that knowing how to Φ just is some kind of ability or disposition to Φ (as opposed to any kind 
of knowing-that). 
3. Demonstration and Epistemic Injustice 
While knowing-how appears to be more difficult to acquire from others via testimony than 
knowing-that, it may also seem that is easier to demonstrate to others that one possesses 
knowing-how than is the case for knowing-that (Annas 2001, Hawley 2011). That is, it may 
seem that something like the following thesis is true: 
The Ease of Demonstration thesis (ED) It is often easier to demonstrate to others that 
one possesses (practical) knowing-how than is the case for knowing-that.  
When I talk of ‘demonstrating’ one’s knowledge what I have in mind is any expression of one’s 
knowledge in action (including but not limited to speech acts) that serves to convince some 
audience that one’s possesses that state of knowledge. The claim made by (ED) then is that it 
is often easier to convince others that one possesses knowing-how through actions that express 
one’s state of knowledge than is the case for knowing-that. 
If Stephanie starts to successfully juggle, for example, it would be very hard for any audience 
witnessing that action to deny that she knows how to juggle. It is possible that her success is 
just some kind of weird fluke or accident. But accidental actions of successfully juggling are 
incredibly unlikely events, which is why it would be hard for anyone to actually doubt that 
Stephanie knows how to juggle upon witnessing her juggling. And this point can hold even if 
her audience does not know how to juggle themselves. For people are often able to identify 
successful performances of a given type of action without being able to perform actions of that 
type themselves (a fact routinely abused by armchair sports fans).  
Of course, people can also express their knowledge-that through their actions—both speech 
acts and other actions—and in many contexts such actions will serve to effectively convince 
an audience that they possess that knowledge. But, in general, it still seems comparatively 
easier for such an audience to raise doubts about whether a person really possesses the 
knowledge-that that they have just expressed in their actions than is the case for when they 
have expressed their knowledge how to Φ by successfully Φ-ing. And if such doubts become 
salient to that audience, then the person’s expression of their knowledge-that may fail to 
demonstrate their knowledge to that audience. 
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Imagine that Stephanie not only knows how to juggle but she also knows that there is milk in 
the fridge, and she wants to find out if her housemate Katrina possesses the equivalent two 
states of knowledge. Stephanie first asks Katrina if she knows whether there is any milk in the 
fridge, and she responds by correctly asserting that there is. Stephanie then asks Katrina if she 
knows how to juggle, and she responds by successfully juggling for a good amount of time. 
Both of Katrina’s actions (her speech act and her juggling) would, in many contexts, be 
effective demonstrations of her respective states of knowledge. However, that point is 
consistent with also acknowledging that sceptical challenges are easier to raise with respect to 
Katrina’s knowledge that there is milk in the fridge than with respect to her knowledge how to 
juggle. If Stephanie knows, say, that Katrina tends to form her beliefs about whether there is 
milk in the fridge on the basis of unreliable testimony from another housemate, or wishful 
thinking, then Stephanie might still have good reason to doubt that Katrina genuinely knows 
(rather than merely believes) that there is milk in the fridge, even after Katrina has correctly 
answered her question. But when it comes to the issue of whether Katrina knows how to juggle 
the origins of her relevant cognitive states or abilities seem largely irrelevant, what matters is 
simply whether she has stable dispositions to reliably perform successful actions of juggling, 
not how she came to have those dispositions. 
As with (DT), the status, nature, and significance of this supposed disanalogy between 
knowing-that and knowing-how are all matters that are open to debate. However, if (ED) is 
true, then we can note that, again, this apparent disanalogy can be explained well by the 
downstream versus upstream knowledge distinction. For the kinds of upstream conditions 
paradigmatically involved in possessing knowledge-that will, by their very nature, tend to be 
more “distal” and indirectly accessible to an audience than the downstream conditions involved 
in possessing knowledge-how. Stephanie cannot directly check, for example, what conditions 
were in place when Katrina formed her belief about the milk given that the event of Katrina 
forming that belief is now in the past. In which case, doubts about whether the right kinds of 
upstream conditions were satisfied at the time will tend to be comparatively easier to raise, and 
harder to dismiss. This is because, on the other hand, there is often much less wiggle room for 
denying that someone is in a state that will reliably guide them in intentional actions of Φ-ing 
after directly witnessing them perform an action of Φ-ing, especially when the relevant type of 
action is one that is difficult to ‘fluke’ like juggling.  
Furthermore, if (ED) is true this might have interesting implications for other issues beyond 
the knowing-how debates. For example, Annas (2001) argues that Mackie’s moral scepticism 
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is implausible, in part, by appealing to (i) the claim that moral knowledge is practical 
knowledge,13 and (ii) the claim that scepticism about practical knowledge is implausible, in 
support of (iii) the claim that moral knowledge is possible. As Annas (2001: 247) writes: 
When I mess up the computer, find a leak under the sink, or find that the car will not start, I take my 
problems to the relevant experts. They are practical experts; I want not a theoretical computer whiz, but 
someone to fix the software, not a Ph.D. in engineering, but someone who can stop the leak, fix the oil 
gauge, and so on. Serious skepticism about the existence of practical experts of this kind does not get off 
the ground. (This is a major reason why discussions of moral knowledge in ancient ethics are not 
structured by skeptical concerns.) I may wonder whether my plumber is really an expert, but there is 
something deeply wrong about the idea that I might hesitate to call anyone listed under "Plumbers" in 
the Yellow Pages to fix my leaking pipe, on the grounds of doubt as to whether there was such a thing 
as knowledge of plumbing. 
Annas does not actually explain why scepticism about the existence of practical expertise and 
knowledge “does not get off the ground”. But it seems plausible that the idea Annas is 
implicitly appealing to here is something like (ET), as (ET) explains why it would be so hard 
to deny that the computer expert knows how to fix the computer after they successfully get it 
running again, or to deny that the plumber knows how to fix the leak after they stop the leak, 
etc. 
And, closer to the themes we have been focused on, Hawley (2011) discusses how (ED) might 
make a difference to how knowing-how interacts with the phenomenon of epistemic injustice 
(Fricker 2007), which is an injustice where someone is harmed specifically in their capacity as 
a knower.14 One way in which you can be so harmed, is if your capacity to possess and share 
knowledge is not recognised by others, due to prejudicial beliefs that they have about a group 
that one is a member of. In particular, Fricker focuses on testimonial injustice where a hearer 
unfairly gives a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s testimony because the hearer accepts 
a prejudicial stereotype which associates members of the relevant group with the property of 
lacking the relevant kind of knowledge, and/or the property of being deceitful. So, for example, 
an Indigenous man in Sydney telling a police officer that he was running to catch a bus and not 
running from a crime,15 may have his testimony dismissed unfairly due to the officer’s 
 
13 See Kotzee (2016) for an interesting discussion which draws on Annas’ work on practical knowledge, and 
also Craig’s work on the function of KNOWS, in arguing for a virtue-based account of knowledge-how. 
 
14 See Chapter [] in this volume for a more in-depth discussion of epistemic injustice.  
 
15 This is an adaption of a case reported in the Sydney Morning Herald and discussed by Ngo (2017: 113). 
16 
 
acceptance of a prejudicial stereotype that Indigenous men are prone to criminality or 
dishonesty.  
Can similar cases arise for knowing-how? Suppose Miriama, who knows how to solve a certain 
math problem, tells her classmate Harry how to solve it by describing the steps involved. But 
Harry does not give due credibility to Miriama’s testimony, and thus fails to recognise her 
knowledge-how, due to his prejudiced belief that women are not as good at math, and his 
inability to grasp that what Miriama has just described is a solution. In those circumstances, 
we can say that Harry has not only harmed Miriama in her capacity as a knower, but specifically 
in her capacity as a possessor of knowledge-how. So, it seems clear that there can be cases of 
testimonial injustice for knowing-how that parallel the standard cases for knowing-that.  
However, the considerations which support (ED) also suggest that there is still a way in which 
it can often be comparatively more difficult for even a prejudiced audience to fail to recognise 
a subject’s knowing-how in situations like this. Suppose, for example, that Miriama solves the 
math problem right in front of Harry on the whiteboard, and that he has the ability to see 
straightaway that it is a solution. In those circumstances, it may be very difficult for Harry to 
sincerely deny that Miriama knows how to solve the problem, even given his prejudicial 
beliefs. Hawley (2011: 297) explains this kind of point by appealing to her notion of the client: 
[I]n many cases, a client can recognize good work, regardless of whether she possesses the relevant 
knowledge how. In such cases, there is no scope for honesty or dishonesty, only good or bad work. Again, 
in such cases, this limits the scope for distinctively epistemic injustice in the client’s relationship with 
the practitioner. 
These points will plausibly apply to many cases but, again as Hawley (2011) discusses, we 
have to be careful not to overstate their significance. For, in other cases, prejudicial stereotypes 
clearly can lead to an audience to make unfair judgments about: (i) whether the relevant action 
of Φ-ing really was performed at all (e.g., when the audience is not competent to identify 
successful performance of Φ-ing they may concede that the performer knows how to do that 
but deny that that is an action of Φ-ing), (ii) whether the performer’s success is a result of 
underlying know-how instead of mere luck, or (iii) how well the action was performed and, by 
extension,  whether they not only know how to Φ but whether they know how to Φ sufficiently 
well. For example, Hawley (2011) discusses Goldin and Rouse’s (2000) findings that, after 
moving to anonymised selection processes, orchestras had a significant increase in the number 
of women selected. This suggests that, prior to the anonymisation, the selection process was a 
case of (iii), with gender prejudices unfairly affecting the selection panel’s judgments of 
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whether the female musicians knew how to play the relevant pieces up to the required 
standards.  
4. Extensions and Connections  
Until now I have, for ease of discussion, been ignoring the fact that the distinction between 
upstream/theoretical versus downstream/practical knowledge likely extends beyond, and cross-
cuts with, the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that (for related discussion see 
Glick 2011: 427–428). It is very plausible that, paradigmatically, knowledge-that ascriptions 
track upstream knowledge and knowing-how-to ascriptions track downstream knowledge. But 
that is consistent with there being some cases where the reverse is true, for both knowing-that 
and knowing-how. And there do seem to be cases for knowing-that, and other forms of 
knowing-wh, where the relevant knowledge ascription is still, intuitively, correct even though 
the subject is in a Gettier-style situation, or their belief is not justified. In particular, Hawthorne 
(2000, 2002) presented a number of influential cases like this in support of the conclusion that 
in “many contexts, Gettierized true belief is knowledge” (2000: 203), and that in such contexts 
“the point of asking knowledge questions is to ask whether someone possesses the information” 
(2002: 254).  
I think the right lesson to draw from such cases is that an interest in whether someone has 
downstream knowledge (that is, a state of true belief which can guide them in successfully 
performing some relevant action) can sometimes dominate when we make ascriptions of 
knowledge other than just ‘S knows how to Φ’ ascriptions.16 In Hawthorne’s cases, the subject 
typically has a true belief—that, say, Boston is the capital of Massachusetts (Hawthorne 2000: 
202-203) or that Vienna is the capital of Austria (2002: 253-254)—which fails to satisfy the 
upstream conditions associated with the inquirer’s concept of knowledge because it was 
obtained in a Gettier-like situation. But, in these cases, the relevant true belief state is still 
naturally interpreted as being one which meets the downstream conditions associated with the 
client’s perspective, with respect to certain abilities made salient in that context like simply 
being able to correctly answer the relevant “What is the capital of X?” question. 
How these different interests—in whether people have upstream versus downstream 
knowledge—interact, respectively, with the semantics and pragmatics of knowledge 
 
16 See Cath (2015: 22-23) and Stanley (2011: 180-181) for different takes on the significance of these cases in 




ascriptions is an important question.17 But whatever the right answers are to that question, we 
will still be confronted with the fact that our knowledge ascribing practices are (in one way or 
another) tracking what appear to be two importantly different kinds of states. And, once this 
point is acknowledged, I think we can start to see how the notion of downstream/practical 
knowledge, and the associated perspective of the client, might help to illuminate debates about 
other forms of knowledge. I want to close by briefly sketching one set of possible connections 
with discussions of moral knowledge and also wisdom. 
It is plausible that much of moral knowledge is, in some sense, a kind of practical knowledge. 
As Annas (2001: 247) writes, “Moral knowledge is, after all, practical knowledge, whatever 
account we give of this; it is knowledge of what to do, and results, often, in doing something”. 
Similarly, Sayre-McCord (1996: 137) writes, “Moral knowledge, to the extent that anyone has 
it, is as much a matter of knowing how—how to act, react, and feel appropriately—as it is a 
matter of knowing that—that injustice is wrong, courage is valuable, and care is due.”  
It is not surprising then that for many claims made about the nature of knowing-how we can 
find closely parallel claims made about the nature of moral knowledge. In particular, in 
discussions of moral testimony one can find all of the following claims which closely parallel 
claims made about knowing-how: (i) moral knowledge or understanding can be present even 
in Gettier-type scenarios or in scenarios where the relevant belief is not justified (Hills 2009), 
(ii) knowing-that does not suffice for moral knowledge (Hopkins 2007 on moral knowing-why) 
or understanding (Hills 2009 on moral understanding-why), (iii) that some forms of moral 
knowledge or understanding cannot easily be acquired via testimony (Driver 2013, Hills 2009, 
Hopkins 2007), and (iv) that moral knowledge or understanding entails the possession of 
certain abilities (Hopkins 2007, Hills 2009).18  Similarly, in the literature on wisdom one can 
 
17 Stanley (2011: 180-181) appeals to Hawthorne’s work to support the conclusion that judgments that a 
knowledge ascription is true in these kinds of cases (where the subject has a true belief that lacks the standard 
upstream conditions associated with knowledge-that) only reflect the pragmatics of uttering such ascriptions and 
not their semantics. But Hawthorne (2003: 254) himself is much more cautious, noting that there are other options 
here including that the reverse is true (i.e., that it could be could be our judgments that knowledge ascriptions 
require more than true belief that stem from merely pragmatic factors), that ‘knows’ is ambiguous, or a 
contextualist semantics. And many other options could also be added to Hawthorne’s list, including that ‘knows’ 
is polysemous or semantically underdetermined.  
 
18 Hills (2009: 104) cites the close connections between moral understanding-why and abilities as a reason to think 
that there are “interesting similarities between moral understanding and knowing-how”. Hills does not identify 
the further similarity that understanding and knowing-how can both appear to be resistant to epistemic luck, but 
her claim about the ability connection comes just after Hills has claimed that moral understanding is distinct from 
propositional knowledge on the grounds that understanding why p has a different relation to epistemic luck than 
knowing why p. Hills (2009: 105) also suggests that if Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) arguments for 
intellectualism succeed they might be extended to understanding-why, although Hills argues that even if that were 
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find claims that wisdom cannot be transmitted via testimony (Ryan 2016: 242), and entails the 
possession of certain abilities (Whitcomb 2011: 97). 
One explanation for these parallels would be that the relevant forms of moral knowledge either 
are explicitly forms of knowing-how (as in Sayre-McCord’s examples above), or can be 
analysed in terms of knowing-how when that is not the case. And in the literature on wisdom, 
it is common to see the suggestion that wisdom can be analysed (at least partly) in terms of 
knowing how to live well (Grimm 2015, Ryan 1996, 1999).19 That idea seems promising to 
me, but I suspect that one cannot analyse all forms of moral knowledge or understanding (like 
knowing or understanding why an action is wrong, or knowing what to do in an ethical situation, 
etc.) in terms of ‘S knows how to Φ’ ascriptions per se (in part simply because that would not 
fit well with the standard question-answer semantics for knowing-wh ascriptions). However, 
once we acknowledge that the category of downstream/practical knowledge extends beyond 
knowledge-how, a more promising approach would be to claim that when we ascribe moral 
knowledge to people, we are often interested in identifying them as people who possess a form 
of downstream knowledge.  
So, for example, following Hopkins (2007: 630) and Hills (2009: 102-3), when we say that 
someone knows or understands why, say, eating meat is wrong (Hills 2009), the idea would be 
that we are often primarily interested in identifying them as someone who possesses a kind of 
downstream knowledge which grounds a set of relevant abilities. Following suggestions by 
Hopkins and especially Hills, the relevant abilities might include the subject being able to offer 
explanations as to why eating meat is wrong, to infer that it is wrong from a set of relevant 
considerations, and to do be able to do the same for other distinct but relevantly similar moral 
questions that they haven’t considered yet. And, given that being in the right kind of action-
guiding state is sufficient for possessing downstream knowledge, we can then explain why 
someone can possess this moral knowledge/understanding even when they are in a Gettier 
situation or when their relevant beliefs are not justified. For one can be in a state which grounds 
those abilities even if that state was formed in a Gettier-style situation. And, given that being 
in a state which grounds those abilities is necessary for possessing downstream knowledge, we 
 
the case it would not matter for her position because even Stanley and Williamson acknowledge that knowing-
how may be a species of propositional knowledge with its own distinctive properties. 
 
19 See Chapter [] in this volume for discussion of this idea. 
20 
 
can also explain why testimony cannot easily deliver moral knowledge/understanding. For 
abilities and skills are not easily acquired through testimony. 
My remarks here are obviously very preliminary. But I think they at least indicate how the idea 
that moral knowledge is a form of downstream/practical knowledge might be useful for helping 
us to understand many of the features of moral knowledge (or understanding) discussed in the 
literature on moral testimony. Furthermore, this idea might help us to see these features not as 
some peculiar quirk of moral knowledge, but rather as part of a broader pattern involving other 
non-moral forms of practical knowledge. When we seek out someone for their moral 
knowledge or wisdom, we could (in the role of the inquirer) be hoping to gain the knowledge 
or wisdom that they possess through their testimony about what is right/wrong, what to do, or 
how to live. But we could also seek them out (in the role of the client) just in the hope that they 
will perform good or wise actions for or with us. And, as with knowledge more generally, our 
concepts of moral knowledge and wisdom seem to be at least as responsive to our needs as 
clients as our needs as inquirers. 
5. Conclusions 
One way of thinking of knowledge is as a special kind of achievement. When we think of 
knowledge this way it is natural to and try to analyse knowledge as a state with certain 
etiological or upstream properties. And, following Craig (1990), this way of thinking of 
knowledge is plausibly connected to an important social function of the concept of knowledge, 
namely, our need to identify reliable informants. Another way of thinking of knowledge is as 
a state that can guide us in action, a state that explains our achievements. When we think of 
knowledge this way it is natural to try to analyse knowledge as a state with certain downstream 
properties. And, following Hawley (2011), this way of thinking of knowledge is plausibly 
connected to a different but equally important social function of the concept of knowledge, 
namely, our need to identify reliable performers.  
The ultimate relationship between these two forms of knowledge is a difficult question, and 
one beyond the scope of this discussion. But what I have tried to suggest here is that the idea 
that knowing-how is (paradigmatically) a kind of downstream knowledge, and that knowing-
that is (paradigmatically) a kind of upstream knowledge, can help to explain certain apparent 
disanalogies between the profiles of knowing-how and knowing-that with respect to acquiring 
knowledge from other people, demonstrating our knowledge to other people, and epistemic 
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injustice. In addition, I suggested that the concept of downstream knowledge might usefully 
connect with discussions of moral knowledge and wisdom.20 
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